175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
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423 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director
[162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

175 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had
177 undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins
648 were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 The British, in the style of the politics of colonial-
648 ism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. One informant, whose father was the paramount leader [124] of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 •177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

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Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of 'umda, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin 'umda died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of shaikh, was a kind of vice-'umda position. The son of the first shaikh is now about 80 years old [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few 'umdas and shaikhs. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of 'umda and shaikh increased as the political needs of the British grew.

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According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

648 727 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about 11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and Sallum. Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

Change and Present Attitudes

648 177 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the tertium quid quality.

[829] It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on these things." "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing, we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did not invent socialism (ishtarikiyya): the Bedouins have always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins. They are referred to as "fallahin" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or baraka ("blessing") by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins

While the Bedouins
795 797 829 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the [576] [578] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 641 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do [651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

648 179 423 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

size in the barley and pasture area of al-Qasr would not permit a subsistence level economy. Just as important is the political implication of any attempt at large-scale land reform in al-Qasr. The pattern of land distribution in al-Qasr reflects an intimate relationship between the structural principles of Bedouin society, especially the lineage system and territoriality. (In a later chapter we will discuss this relationship.) The ramifications of land reform would amount to a structural rearrangement of al-Qasr society and would make redistribution of land difficult to administer, or even to imagine. A reorganization of property relations is, in effect, a basic change in the authority structure. Therefore, the Bedouins want no part of land reform. There is a law which forbids the ownership of "more than 100 feddans (one feddan=one acre) of agricultural land. This shall also apply to barren and desert land."[1] One of my informants, a large landowner, claims that this "law only applies to the Nile Valley where there is plenty of water. If the government wants the Bedouins to abide by that law then they must take care of us. I would gladly trade this land (which was considerably more than 100 feddans) for 100 feddans in the Nile Valley." The traditional tribal structure of Bedouin society

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[1] "Decree for the Amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Southern Region," Department of Information, Cairo, July 25, 1961.

makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful, but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid." Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn: "They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians," they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

tions and innovations in agriculture which the Egyptians bring to the desert. On the other hand, the Bedouins do not get the modern materials which they need to increase the production of their land. This is most serious when it comes to heavy farm machinery, such as tractors, and the spare parts to keep it functioning. Furthermore, seldom did a man in al-Qasr receive the number of olive seedlings that he requested. This invariably led to bitterness between Bedouins and Egyptians.

Most of the Bedouins believe that the desert is a difficult (wihsha) life, and they favor change. They want to know, for instance, why an American would leave home to live such a life.

At a Governor's Council meeting which I attended, the Bedouin representative from al-Qasr did not protest government interference. He complained that the Governor was not furnishing the materials and facilities which the Bedouin needed if he was to become "modern" and "educated." The Bedouins' major complaint about the Egyptians is not that they are trying to change the desert, but that they are not changing it fast enough!

423 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out
657 by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part
656 because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden area in al-Qasr would be the 'izba sector) is not considered "tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and pasture regions.

653 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law"
•177 has been an important catalyst for social, economic and
*613 political change. All of these aspects of change had repurcussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative
177 Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative
474 societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert.
[433] Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
•179 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
179 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

659 The major problem encountered by the government officials
179 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195 "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe:
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

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433 this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-27).

[474] F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the mintaqa) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on their property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify
747 for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local coopera-
177 tive society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of
474 government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters
426 membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a
[571] complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
• 177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
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426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
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177 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
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[433] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices related to the traditional productive organization, i.e., pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system of meanings in terms of which social action takes place (Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one. But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently of a specific cultural structure.

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The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastoralist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and complex market operations. They understand the logic and operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

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The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased while pastoralist activities became less important. In the past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;" even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
• 197 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
198 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
197 vegetables being grown in the 'izba sector of the coast and
198 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased. The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial. But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in the term ma'isha simha, and, as I have noted, they identify it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher priced market in Alexandria.

The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the 'izba of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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TABLE 1

ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	32,488 (80%)
Almond	57	2,570	1,752 (67%)
Fig	66	10,537	(experimental stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 (100%)
Peach	2.5	804	200 (20%)

in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only 27 men. Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the 'izba sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first cash

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[749] crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed and put into operation in al-Qasr.

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435 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the government for the price of two piasters (about six cents). This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

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177 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

654 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400
245 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees.
•147 His increase has not all been at government expense, but a large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area on the coast. In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at
[312] least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays
[452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production, because he sees the future security of the olive market. Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. Of the thirteen
657 cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the
474 largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

244 all times of the day in the desert. The Bedouins had most of these crops before the government came to al-Qasr. Since [177] 1960, however, the Bedouins have been planting new crops such as okra, squash, cucumber, tomato, spinach and melon. All of 244 these are plants adopted from the Nile Valley. Vegetables 312 are grown by means of irrigation or dry-farming. Where there is no well water, an individual will cultivate without irrigation. In this case, crops are planted in the spring after the rains. This method is called ba'ali. Irrigation makes it possible for a man to obtain four crops during the year, but usually, the Bedouin is more concerned with security than with profit. Therefore, most Bedouins try for one good crop 244 and allow a portion of the land to remain fallow. Land which has been planted all year around needs at least one year's rest before it can be replanted. The vegetable harvest usually takes place in July or August.

241 The government has attempted to introduce other crops 177 into al-Qasr which have failed. Failure is related to two 312 main problems in al-Qasr: salination arising from the short supply of fresh water, and the Bedouin's misunderstanding of 245 the techniques of successful irrigation farming. Figs have 177 not been successful in al-Qasr due to the nature of the soil itself. The almond tree has succumbed to the climate of al- [132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season, fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
179 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 241 654 [132] In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local government officials of the reclamation project requested an additional fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow 15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change, 731 233 [654] a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals, and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this. [166] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley, or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica. Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the [432] [435] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this, he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk reprisals.

177 657 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

177 This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political
657 aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

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433 Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is
434 because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for
[435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the ma'isha simha which it

177 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the
433 growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector
434 will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives
177 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for,
434 in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy.
435 Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

423 Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership
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Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage zones, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

428 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent,
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[422] which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
• 177 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
178 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

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and are related to the organizational principles mentioned above.

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The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The

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political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
*179 traditional situation.
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The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent concrete authority structures, or political groups. This follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or what we call political structures, most often deal with the exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power relations do occur and when present complicate the situation. In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority (Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
*613 authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
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*613 178 598 [194] office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds: a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or, between heads of corporate groups. In al-Qasr, the capacity for either type of fission is limited by the political environment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

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*613 178 177 578 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959) emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing; depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait, 'ait, 'aiela and qabiila interchangeably. The term bait literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean "the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent" [594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and [596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex- [621] tended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp, usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may 196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc- *613 casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness. The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group also. [619] The term qabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are 196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 867 584 872 The most important duties of a father toward his son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to 593 852 [872] [583] Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries. [177] In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family 593 852 178 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In [626] [481] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

593 [207] [177] During the present time when most of the Bedouins own a transistor radio, a son will not even listen to songs or poetry broadcast over the air if his father is within hearing distance. I once witnessed a well-meaning father try unsuccessfully to get his ten year old son to sit down and listen with him to the news on the radio. This automatic deference paid to the father 593 561 is extended to all male elders: the father-son relationship is the model for authority relations between generations. [296] But there are degrees in which the model is applied to behavior; for instance, a boy will not smoke in front of his older brother, his uncles and grandfather, but will feel no uneasiness about smoking in the company of an elder with whom he has no immediate authority relationship.

593 The filial piety which marks the father-son authority relationship is owed to the father until his death. As the son grows older, he may show a little less constraint but he still plays the role of the subordinate. For example, I never saw a son argue with his father over anything during my stay in the field, with one serious exception. One man who had broken off friendly relations with his brother objected to the presence of his brother's sons at the wedding of his own daughter. When he threatened to cause a public scene to embarrass his nephews before the other guests, his own sons defended the right of their cousins to be at their sister's wedding. They told their father that his quarrel

671 change in al-Qasr must proceed.

671 Bedouin law should be considered within its historical
• 177 context, especially as it has reference to the Maliki school of Islamic Law. The Maliki school, or "rite," (madhhab) of law is considered to be the most conservative interpretation of the doctrine of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the Maliki school is thought to reflect the society and tribal traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia more dependably than any of the other three schools of law. For instance, the Maliki
671 school, in the domain of family law, stresses the importance
177 and the primacy of agnate rights and claims. This is es-
428 pecially so in matters of inheritance: the law states that in the absence of agnate heirs the property of the deceased passes, not to female survivors but, to the central treasury
[562] of the State. This single legal aspect helps us to understand the Bedouin practice of disallowing the female to inherit and should be a consideration in any study of Bedouin succession rules.

175 Maliki Law was introduced into North Africa during
671 the ninth century, and became the official legal doctrine of
177 the Berber dynasties. It was first taught in this part of the world, probably, by Yahya ibn Yahya, a student of Malik ibn Anas, the founder of the school. Murray (1935:313) presents a valuable legal document from the Western Desert in which the name "Yahya" is frequently cited as the authority

175 671 177 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law, 671 177 derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia, may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-[428] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of [562] Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit, though they do have other, and more secular, justifications for the practice.

671 182 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the 'awaiyid 648 can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that "the government does not understand the problems of the Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the desert." They feel that they need the 'awaiyid for the sake of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have the 'awaiyid, they would eat each other. The 'awaiyid is so important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the 'awaiyid and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

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The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

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Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the political order.

[598] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[179] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

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> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

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Besides the 'aqila and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must
571 figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand
• 177 and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the other to the relatively new legal authority structure of the nation state.

554 The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically
571 influential roles is that they possess a high degree of "status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be a person of low economic status but who would belong to the "status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate.

* [613] [177] The authority of the 'aqila and the governmental offices of 'umda and shaikh are legitimate only where formal litigation [627] is concerned. Beyond this, they may have influence, not legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles and operate as a rajal khair.

554 571 and operate as a rajal khair.

554 571 ●177 *613 [627] There are two primary types of political roles in al-Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal political roles have been decreed from above by the government. The traditional roles of 'aqila and "third party" represent autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of 'aqila is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of 'umda and shaikh are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office" [627] (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the 'aqila or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

554 178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization 128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence [571] [635] resides with them. With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

634 to the 'umda. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
[178] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
•[177] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held offices in the U:A.R. governmental structure, he feels that elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair. Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and control of external relations.

634 The offices of 'umda and shaikh are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of 'aqila, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of 'aqila is functional at
[428] the bait level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the offices of 'umda and shaikh should go to the "best men" in the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
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121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

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121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the "great tradition" is represented in the writings and public actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)" (1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference group theory to understand human behavior in society. In the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group" members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian "status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the process of taking on the values of a new reference group to which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the "great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior, or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type of status consciously desired, the local authority and social structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty, obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962: 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the 'aqila fulfills
121 554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
* [613 with conflict regulation. The rajal khair role, as I have
627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The rajal khair dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new power structure based on national and political consciousness. Traditionally, rajal khair-dominance was not by force but through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 554 627 [634] * [613] [178] fully organized government behind the role, the element of force may enter into the rajal khair style of domination. Thus far, the 'umda and the shaikh roles have functioned through the traditional roles of the 'aqila and the rajal khair, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

121 571 554 • [177] The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people" or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal role of 'aqila, his political activity was ultimately limited by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
•[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties, Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority structure which has reference to both the internal and external political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful bait." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of 'umda: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj 'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to his own property in the 'izba sector of al-Qasr. The one exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[871] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
[897] He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 156 159 554 635 177 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation [548] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 159 554 635 177 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his status and political leadership and the fact that he has assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr during this period of change. Once each year the Governor makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635 would inquire into the matter.
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156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
177 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
537 alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
635 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
537 speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin, had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] 'umda and shaikh had accompanied the Governor on his tour

156 159 554 635 537 634 122 522 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished) with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj 'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 177 178 We can see how these details carry larger implications within the context of political and social structures undergoing change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 159 554 177 178 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is politically active and representative in both the traditional and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social and personal reasons.

156 159 554 177 178 124 829 571 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came around to the subject of international politics, whether this was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact. When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan. I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
571 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
574 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
829 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
582 speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.

● [177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
• 177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the alloca-
tion of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
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There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the 'awaiyid either.

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This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one 'aqila voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their 'umda because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.
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178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert, here in particular, we need olive presses. This will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> [489] plants them and the transportation is such that we cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest change in the desert results from the presence of 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools, now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . . Another cause of change is due to the fact that everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I, and I know better than my father did, who lived in al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
178 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
177 in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali realizes his marginal position between the new and the old, and his attitude concerning change through education seems to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins. This is indicated by the following event. One month before I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj 'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

"modern industrial society," it was not easy work. This, despite the fact that there was no language barrier, seeing that I spoke the same language of the group, or rather they spoke my native language; I had no problems of introduction because I had worked in the area and become acquainted with a number of the tribal members in 1958. When I went to the field, I then sought out these old friends who introduced me to other members of the group. 114 114 122 123

At the beginning, I made a deliberate effort to avoid associating with the government officials who worked in the area, even though they were quite willing to help and seemed to have an intimate knowledge of the people in the area. I had thought that any identification with the government would put me in a suspicious situation as far as the tribal groups were concerned, and thus prevent me from having good rapport with them. Later, however, I realized that the relationship between the government officials in the area and the tribal population was extremely good, and they always looked to the government as a source of aid and support to them. There was no conflict of interest between the state administration and the tribal groups. In fact, people accepted me more readily whenever they knew that I had worked for the Egyptian government. This later developed into a time-consuming and disappointing experience when many of the tribal members came to me asking for help getting employment in the government projects in the area, or to have their sons accepted in certain government schools, or to get some favored treatment from the government relief organizations. 114 123 177 [657]

The difficulty I encountered in my field work stemmed from the interplay of three major factors: the reliance on the case study method which necessitates the intimate knowledge of the events, facts, and parties involved in each case; being a female anthropologist in a society where women by definition are barred from public participation and particularly 114 123

full-time employment with the government projects in the area and settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.

With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954, the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda system, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process. The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

657 692 177 178 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court proceedings.

69 681 177 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is defined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault resulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases [629 521] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people. When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case. Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

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required for the indictment of the offender according to the modern legal system. If this is not possible and the offender is sentenced by the government court, only half the tribal settlement is paid, and the rest is postponed pending the release of the offender. If the offender is executed or he dies in prison, then the unpaid part of the settlement is dropped.

His success in solving disputes between members of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait, but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person would become a de facto Aqila.

The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leadership among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before, the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the government representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifications with regard to education (must be able at least to read and write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that member-
ship in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[631] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
[625] bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
619 reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
634 concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
[795] The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
[361] reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the prin-
ciple of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

554 The most powerful
197 and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
634 ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
619 where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
[622] Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district
554 to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each.
619 There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered
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581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
671 and the family further required the registration of the marriage con-
675 tract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[84] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
429 kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
[604] A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
585 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
792 tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[619] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
[778] the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
585 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
656 the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
197 the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
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Still, according to the unofficial estimates, only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that should be kept away from the State legal system.

Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr" and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases where the son has independent means of support for himself and his bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between her family and the families of the other wives which makes

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[629] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punishment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

ORIGIN AND EXPANSION OF THE SANUSIYA

The desire to establish in North Africa conditions in which Muslims might live by their own laws and under their own government, as they did in Arabia under the first four Caliphs, led the Grand Sanusi and his successors to oppose the Turkish way of life and the influences and innovations of Western Christendom, but their intransigence in these matters did not imply intolerance, far less aggressiveness. Though some writers have made assertions to the contrary, the Sanusi have never shown themselves more hostile than other Muslims to Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi scrupulously avoided all political entanglements which might bring them into unfriendly relations with neighbouring States and the European Powers. The Brothers of the Order were discouraged from discussing political questions. Nor were the Sanusi intolerant towards fellow Muslims who differed from them. Shaikh Muhammed 'Uthman records of Sayyid al-Mahdi that 'the persons he dislikes the most are those who speak ill of Muslims'.[1] The leaders of the Sanusiya have always tolerated other and rival Orders, even when they have disapproved of their rites. The Grand Sanusi had himself been a member of a succession of Orders before he started his own and he allowed, as his successors have done, members of other Orders to belong to the Sanusiya at the same time.

The leaders of the Order have also been tolerant towards the cult of saints, unlike the iconoclastic Wahhabi, who have destroyed even the tombs of those nearest to the Prophet himself. The view held by the doctors of orthodox Islam is that, though intercession through a saint is unlawful and the only mention of him during prayers at his tomb should be to ask the mercy of God on his soul, it is permissible to show respect to his tomb and his memory. The heads of the Sanusiya have, however, always tolerated among their Bedouin followers a regard for holy men and their tombs which goes beyond mere respect. It is unlikely that they felt any repugnance to the cult, because they counted among their forbears several saints and were themselves brought up in North Africa where the cult of saints is widespread and very near to the hearts of the common people; and they could not have remonstrated with the Bedouin for believing that holy men and their tombs are sources of *baraka*,

[1] Op. cit., p. 121.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their leadership.

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The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

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Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expression of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

of a people to live according to their own traditions and institutions. To-day this desire is expressed in the political language of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious movements. Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its dress is new.

As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character, austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations. Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi and without here discussing whether the time at which he taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

from Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib on his travels backwards and forwards to Arabia. He found in Cyrenaica a tribal structure of a simple kind on which it was possible to build a missionary organization, but not out of which it could be built. He brought this organization with him to Cyrenaica, a band of devoted followers whose allegiance had been tried by many vicissitudes. It must be remembered also that these intimates of the Grand Sanusi were foreigners to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, with whom they had no ties of kinship, so that they stood always outside the tribal system and were not involved in the ancient loyalties and feuds inherent in Bedouin society. The missionary organization, the Sanusiya Order, was separate from the tribal system, and by centring it in the distant oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it from becoming identified with any one tribe or section of the country, as it might have become had it been centred in Cyrenaica proper. As we will see, it was the local attachment of the tribes to the zawiyas in their territories, and the attachment of the Shaikhs of these zawiyas to the Head of the Order, which made the Order so effective a missionary Body, and eventually enabled it to become a political force.

The Grand Sanusi died at Jaghbub on 7 September 1859 and was buried there. Later a magnificent shrine, furnished with ornate trappings, was erected over his bones and was surmounted with a white cupola, which gleams several miles away as one approaches the oasis. The shrine is of Egyptian craftmanship and seems incongruous in its desert surroundings and unfamiliar among a simple people.

There can be no gainsaying that al-Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi was a great man and his life's work a great achievement. He is said to have been tall and of a distinguished appearance, an eloquent speaker, and a wise teacher.[1] His religious personality may be estimated by the fact that many Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans were so inspired by his teaching and example that they left their homes and followed him on his travels and at his orders went as missionaries into new lands, and by the fact that the Bedouin of Arabia and Libya, who are a reserved and unheeding people, accepted him as their guide in things both spiritual and temporal.

[1] Adams, op. cit., p. 10.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban education and they acted as links between the citizen communities and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with town merchants and officials what was happening in the world outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered. But though maintaining communications with the towns, neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on the country and not the country on the towns, because there was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber-speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies, and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically, the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the

[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 619 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without law or effective government, for the Turks had little control over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to [181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who [779] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about [797] the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary Order and can only be understood as such.

771 [797] Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts. It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they [186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim. The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties. But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more [782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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CHAPTER IV

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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*795 *648 UNTIL 1912, when Turkey surrendered Libya to Italy, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were part of the Ottoman Empire and it was under Turkish hegemony that the Sanusiya Order was born and grew to maturity. The Turkish administration was an important influence in its development and must be reviewed.

[IM] *648 I have seen the relics of the Ottoman Empire, men and places, in most lands of the Levant and North Africa and have admired the economy with which it bestowed peace upon the Arab world for close on 400 years. The Turks well understood that the successful practice of the art of administration depends not only on attention to some things but no less on inattention to others. They did not confuse government with bureaucratic interference in the name of moral regeneration. A general condemnation of Turkish rule has, however, been so long fashionable that I can scarcely hope to alter so widely accepted a judgement. I can do no more than make a passing gesture of respect to one of the characters in this Cyrenaican story, the Turk.

*175 *648 We have only such bare hints of what happened in Cyrenaica after the Hilalian invasion as Arab historians give us. At the downfall of the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt in 1517 Cyrenaica went with that country to the Turks, and its history under Ottoman rule from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century is almost entirely a blank. One may say with some confidence, however, that the Bedouin were little affected by Turkish rule. Those nearest to the coastal towns were doubtless compelled to pay taxes from time to time, but the tribes as a whole must have continued to lead their ancient way of life and to settle their own affairs among themselves. In 1711 a rebellion at Tripoli against the Sultan's authority led to the emergence of a local Janissary dynasty, the Caramanlis, who for a time exercised control over Cyrenaica also. It was during the period of their rule that Paolo Della Cella accompanied a military expedition sent by the Pasha of Tripoli to Darna. He records how the Bedouin whose country was traversed by the expedi-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[P.104]

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

128 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya
*795 took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured
*648 its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under
*175 its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner I indicate forthwith.

121 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the
182 Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental,
or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period
*648 of time all the segments of the society should find themselves in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of opposition to some political group outside them which has a different kind of political structure and belongs to a different political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis* this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself. The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took [177] on the political form of the European countries into the orbit of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European state.

*175 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made
*648 peace the tribes continued their resistanee in the name of the
*795 Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against
619 tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible. Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin, would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include, for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top. 671
Here again it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened, 672
as the evidence was again contradictory. Apparently, when 682
Ahmed reached the ledge at half-way, he fumbled about in the dim light for the foot holes; and just at this psychological moment the rope broke.

The ten men holding the rope at the top collapsed one on the top of another; but when they had recovered their presence of mind, they shouted down to Ahmed, to ask if he were all right. A faint voice from the bowels of the earth replied that he had fallen heavily on a stone and had had a nasty knock, but that he would be all right in a few minutes.

They then produced a spare rope for another man to go down and get Ahmed up; but they discovered that the only one they had to hand was too short by several feet. A man was sent post-haste on a pony to get another rope from the encampment a mile or so away, and when he returned after a quarter of an hour, volunteers were quickly forthcoming to go down and retrieve Ahmed. On reaching the bottom they found that the unfortunate man, either stunned by the fall or overcome by foul air, had collapsed flat on the bottom of the well, and had been drowned in six inches of water. They hauled his body up to the surface, and Ali, terrified that he might be held in some way responsible, counselled all present to bury the dead man then and there, and to say nothing about it. However, [123]
news quickly spreads; and the same day an informer came to the police post and reported the matter, and Ali was arrested and subsequently sentenced to three months' imprisonment with labour by the present writer, for failure to notify a death under unusual circumstances. (Incidentally this did not constitute an offence under Bedouin [177]•
Law, but was a contravention of the Police Code and was punished as such. Hence the apparent interference in a purely Bedouin concern.)

While Ali was still serving his sentence, Ahmed's rela- [694]